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1 Therehas not been much research done so far on this Russian thinker with growingpopularity in the West.
Studies in German: Fairy von Lilienfeld, ‘Erzpriester Aleksandr Me(1935-1990)’, in: Karl Christian Felmy et al.
(eds.), Kirchenim Kontextunterschiedlicher Kulturen. Auf dem Wegin das dritte Jahrtausend, (Gttingen1991), 17-
37. I also refer to my recently published book: Igor Pochoshajew, Stellen wir die Altre auf… Aleksandr Men’ zum
Verhltnis vonKirche und Staat, and my article: ‘Die Einheit der Christen im Denken von Aleksandr Men’’. Studies
in English: Michael A. Meerson, ‘The Life and Work of Father Aleksandr Men’’, in: Stephen K. Batalden (ed.),
SeekingGod :The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia, (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern
Illinois Univ. Press, 1993), 13-28. Elizabeth Roberts and Ann Shukman, Christianity for the Twenty-First Century:
The Life and Work of Alexander Men, (London 1996). Studies in French: Yves Hamant, Alexandre Men: un tmoin
pour la Russie de ce temps, (Paris 1993); ‘Liminaire’, in: Plamia : Bulletin publien collaboration avec le Centre
d’tudes Russes Saint-Georges, 80 (1991) 1, 3-6.
2 Aleksandr Men’, ‘Vom „geistigen Defizit“ in der Gesellschaft’, in: Osteuropa 42 (1992) 1, A 25 – A 28,
p. A 26; Cf. Aleksandr Men’, ‘Interv’na sluaj aresta’, in: Aleksandr Men’, Kul’tura i duhovnoe voshodenie,
(Moskva 1992), 356-363, p. 363.
3 Here some books written from very different perspectives: Kathrin Behrens, Die Russische Orthodoxe
Kirche: Segen fr die »neuen Zaren«?, (Paderborn, 2002 [Mnchen, Univ., Diss., 2000]). Otto Luchterhandt, Der
Sowjetstaat und die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche. Eine rechtshistorische und rechtssystematische Untersuchung, (Kln,
1976,Abhandlungen desBundesinstituts frostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien,30). Pitirim, Metropolit
von Volokolamsk und Juriev (ed.), Die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche, (Berlin/New York, 1988), 56-124.
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PERSPECTIVES ON THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN SOVIET TIMES
by Igor Pochoshajew
Igor Pochoshajew (Russian Orthodox) is Junior Professor for European History of
Religions - Intercultural History of Christianity, Theological Faculty, Univ. of
Rostock, Germany. He received his Dipl.Theol., PhD as well as the Habilitation at
the University of Rostock,. He also received the M.Litt., Classics, Trinity College
Dublin, Republic of Ireland, and the Diplme d’Etudes Approfondies, Theology,
Univ. of Strasbourg II, France,. Among his books and articles Alexander Men’ on the
Relationship between Church and State, Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 2006 (in
German).
Interpretation of recent history is a huge task that Russia has still to complete.
Aleksandr Men’, a Russian-Orthodox priest murdered in 1995,1 regarded examination of the
past a necessary condition to build the future.2 There have not been many efforts spent on
this task yet. Of course, there would be different issues to explore and various methods to
approach the questions. The history of the Russian-Orthodox Church is surely one of the
issues to explore, but I do not know any analyses devoted to it. It is not my intention here to
write a history of the Russian Orthodox Church in Soviet times; many comprehensive studies
on this issue have been published.3 Not much could be added to what has been already
written. But with archives becoming accessible after Perestroika, some additional material
concerning the period after the revolution of 1917 can be studied to complete our knowledge
4 It is what I have tried to do exploring the recently published volumes, which contain documentation
concerning Patriarch Tikhon: M.E., Gubonin (ed.), Akty svtejego Tihona, patriarha moskovskogo i vseRossii,
Moskva1994; Sledstvennoedelo Patriarha Tuhona. Sbornik dokumentov, (Moskva, 2000). My own research results
are upcoming: Igor Pochoshajew, ‘Patriarch Tichon und die Sowjetmacht’, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 124
(2007).
5 My assessment relies on methodical reflections of the analyses, which studied the image of Christianity
in schoolbooks of Islamic countries: Klaus Hock/ Johannes Lhnemann (eds.), Die Darstellung des Christentums in
Schulbchern islamisch geprgter Lnder. Wolfram Reiss, Teil 1:gypten und Palstina, Schenefeld 2005, 23.
6 Peter Hauptmann/ Gerd Stricker (eds.), Die Orthodoxe Kirche in Russland. Dokumente ihrer Geschichte
(860-1980), (Gttingen, 1988), 648-649, text 217.
7 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 657, text 223.
8 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 664, text 230.
9 Wladimir Lenin, ‘Sozialismus und Religion’, in: Wladimir Lenin, ber die Religion. Eine Sammlung
ausgewhlter Aufstze und Reden, (Berlin 1960).
10 Wladimir Lenin, ‘ber das Verhltnis der Arbeiterpartei zur Religion’, in: Lenin, op.cit.
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about the destiny of the Russian-Orthodox Church in this particularly obscure and difficult
time.4
My objective in this paper is to explore three genres of interpretations of history of
the Orthodox Church: 1. The official view of the Russian Orthodox Church about its history
consisting of declarations made by the Orthodox hierarchs during the Soviet time and during
Perestroika, as well as the most recent church position on this question. The comparison will
allow us to explore the question of whether there have been any significant changes in the
interpretation given by the Church itself. 2. The interpretation of Alexander Men’, who is
currently becoming one of the most influential Orthodox thinkers based on his works. And
3. Interpretations presented in textbooks, as they allow evaluating the views that the next
generations will likely hold.5 In the beginning it will, however, be necessary to give a short
historical overview.
Some months after the October Revolution, the new Bolshevik government declared
the separation between church and state by a decree on 23rd January 1918. The decree forbade
religious teaching in public and private schools. Churches and religious societies were not
allowed to own property. The possessions of the Russian Orthodox Church were confiscated.6
The new constitution of 1918 confirmed the separation between church and state, and granted
freedom of religious and antireligious propaganda to all citizens. The constitution practically
excluded clergymen and monks of all religions from political life by denying them the right
to vote and to be elected.7 The new government did not limit itself to legal matters, but
decided to start a broad antireligious propaganda.8
The theoretical base for these measures was laid out by the leader of the communist
revolution in Russia, Lenin, in two of his programmatic scripts: “Socialism and Religion”9
and “On the Relationship of Working Class with Religion.”10 Being a historic materialist
11 Ibid., 24.
12 Wladimir Lenin, ‘Sozialismus und Religion’, 6; Cf. Lenin, ‘ber das Verhltnis der Arbeiterpartei’, 20.
23.
13 Lenin, ‘Sozialismus und Religion’, 8-9.
14 Lenin, ‘Sozialismus und Religion’, 10; vgl. Lenin, ‘ber das Verhltnis der Arbeiterpartei’, 20. 24. 26.
15 Lenin, ‘Sozialismus und Religion’, 11; vgl. Lenin, ‘ber das Verhltnis der Arbeiterpartei’, 21. 23.
16 Wolfgang Heller, ‘Die RussischeOrthodoxe Kirche’, in: Christoph Gassenschmidt/ Ralph Tuchtenhagen
(eds.), Politik und Religion in der Sowjetunion 1917-1941, (Wiesbaden 2001), 13-46, 22.
17 The synod of the Russian Orthodox Church (1917/18) elected on the 18th November 1917 Metropolitan
of MoscowTikhon (Bellavin) (1865-1925) tobe the newpatriarch after the patriarchal chair had remained vacant for
nearly 200 years.
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVII, 1 (February 2007) page 22
Lenin conceived of religion as a product of social conditions. According to him, the lower
social classes needed religion to express their helplessness in the current economic situation.11
For a political party that intends to change social conditions and to improve the economic
situation of the masses, religion must be neutral. Religion is regarded as socially harmful as it
stabilizes and legitimizes ideologically unjust social conditions and economic structures.12 It
is why, according to Lenin, it is necessary to combat religion. As to the weapons, Lenin was
of the opinion that they have to be spiritual, such as articles, books, and media. Lenin
demanded that a future communist state in Russia introduce a strict and consequent
separation between state and religion.13 Being anxious at the same time to avoid repeating the
error of German Social Democrats, Lenin emphasized that antireligious struggle cannot be
limited to antireligious propaganda, but social conditions need to be changed first of all.14
Lenin believed that, when the social basis of religion is removed, religion will simply
disappear.15 History proved that he was wrong.
Lenin’s view of religion and his demands concerning religious legislation have two
methodological consequences. Firstly, seen from a formal juridical perspective, an
antireligious persecution has never taken place in Russia.16 Secondly, as Lenin’s theory
concerning the disappearance of religion did not work totally, there were various attempts of
different degrees of cruelty to adapt reality to this theory. The darkest period in this respect
and the bloodiest time for the Orthodox Church was the years after the October Revolution of
1917. To elucidate this period it is helpful to differentiate between the Russian population in
general, the simple clergymen of the Orthodox Church, and the high clergy and Patriarch
Tikhon.17
This period is particularly dark not only for moral but also for methodological
reasons. Neither were documents preserved nor archives established which would contain
lists of people executed during this time. It is evident that entire social classes were extirpated
by the new rulers. According to Vladimir Solouchin, who examined literary sources,
18 Vladimir Solouchin, “Anstze zur »Entleninisierung«”, in: Adolf Hampel, Glasnost und Perestroika –
eine Herausforderung fr die Kirchen, (Frankfurt am Main 1989), 183-194, p. 184-185.
19 Vladimir Bon-Bruevi, „ivacerkov’“ i proletatiat, Moskva 1929, 1-8. 12-13. 17.
20 Vladimir Lenin, ‘Neizdannoe pis’molenam politbro’, in: Vestnik Russkogo Christianskogo Dvizenija,
98 (1970) 4, 54-57, p. 54. 57.
21 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 671, text 234.
22 Ibid.; compare. Akty svtejego Tihona, 15(28).02.1922, 190.
23 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 674-676, text 236.
24 Lenin, ‘Neizdannoe pis’mo’, 54-57.
25 Chrysostomus, Kirchengeschichte Russlands, 120; Roman Rssler, Kirche und Revolution in Russland,
Patriarch Tichon und der Sowjetstaat, Kln/Wien 1969, 43.
26 Akty svtejego Tihona , 833-909.
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approximately 15 to 17 million people were exterminated during the years 1917/18.18 We
cannot say exactly how many clergymen lost their lives during these so-called
“administrative killings,” but taking into account the political significance that the church had
for the communist government we must conclude, that their number was significant. We have
some pieces of theoretical evidence: According to Vladimir Bon-Bruevi, one of the
leading Bolsheviks, the Orthodox clergy represented one pillow of the Russian monarchy and
for ideological reasons supported reactionary activities.19 Lenin himself called Patriarch
Tikhon a leader of the counterrevolutionary clergy.20 These assessments of two leading
Bolsheviks make it possible to conclude, that Orthodox clergy was one of the primary targets.
We can draw further conclusions from a pragmatic text, which Lenin wrote in a
particular situation: After the famine of the summer 1921 in the Volga region the Soviet
government ordered in a decree of 23rd February 1922 that church valuables are to be
confiscated and sold.21 The money should be used to buy food for the suffering population.
Local Soviets were charged with the confiscation.22 In some towns there were clashes
between the Orthodox population and confiscating commandos. On the background of these
events Lenin wrote a secret letter to members of the Politburo on the 19th March 1922.23 In
this letter Lenin proposed to use the situation in order to arrest and to execute the largest
possible number of the oppositional middle class and the clergy. Lenin was of the opinion
that the apocalyptic mood of the population was favorable for such a measure. As to the
confiscated Church valuables, accordingly to Lenin they should be used by the government to
improve its gold stock.24
These factors confirm the view generally accepted by scholars that during the year
after the communist revolution in Russia a large number of Orthodox clergymen lost their
lives.25 The recently published documents give a precise but not complete account of the high
number of Orthodox clergy killed at this time.26 Patriarch Tikhon himself represents a
27 Karl-Christian Felmy, ‘Patriarch Tichon im Urteil der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche der Gegenwart’, in:
Kirche im Osten 8 (1965) 25-54.
28 Akty svtejego Tihona , 19.01(01.02).1918, 82-85.
29 Akty svtejego Tihona , 02(?).1918, 103-105.
30 Akty svtejego Tihona , 26.07(08.08).1918, 144-147.
31 Akty svtejego Tihona , 25.10(07.11)1918, 151-153.
32 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 69-73, Nr. 4-9; Cf. 76, Nr.14.
33 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 93, Nr. 27; 255, Nr.150; 263-332.
34 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 100-101, Nr.32.
35 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona, 93-98, Nr.28, p. 93 Akty svtejego Tihona, 04(17).12.1920, 169.
36 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 92, Nr.26; 100f, Nr.32.
37 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 100-101, Nr.32.
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particular and very controversial case. Regarding this issue Karl-Christian Felmy pointed to
the particular significance that the person of the Patriarch has for the Moscow Patriarchate
and for the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad: Both of them refer to him to legitimize their
positions.27 This significance of Tikhon has to be borne in mind, when we read assessments
of representatives of different branches of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Tikhon and the Synod which elected him, pronounced a very harsh criticism against
the new rulers. In his letter of the 1st of February 1918 Tikhon anathematized the atrocities
committed in large parts of the country. He condemned the exclusion of the Church from
public life as well as destructions and desecrations of churches and Orthodox sanctuaries and
expropriation of churches and monasteries.28 In a letter, that Tikhon possibly wrote in
February 1918 he characterized the new rulers as enemies of Russia.29 A letter of the
Patriarch written on the 8th March 1918 called attacks on the Orthodox Church satanic.30 In
his letter to the Counsel of People’s Commissioners of the 7th November 1918 Tikhon
strongly condemned communist politics.31 In the night from the 11th to the 12th November the
house of Tikhon was searched, he himself was put under house arrest.32 An accusation against
him was prepared; the Patriarch should be put on trial.
Tikhon was accused of spreading counterrevolutionary propaganda and of supporting
activities against the new political system.33 The real intention of the communist government
was however to reduce Tikhon’s influence within the population by discrediting him through
a juridical procedure.34 In fact, the Patriarch’s popularity caused headache to the new rulers;35
it is why they decided to restrict his activities. But there obviously was no clear conception of
how to handle the problem, as even people within the government did not really know, why
Tikhon was under house arrest.36 Kalinin sent an inquiry to Dzerinskij asking him about
reasons for Tikhon’s house arrest.37
38 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 112, Nr.45.
39 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 337f, Nr.171
40 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 334, Nr.166; 336f, Nr.169f.
41 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 357, Nr.183; Akty svtejego Tihona, 03(16).06.1923, 280f.
42 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 358, Nr.184; Akty svtejego Tihona, 12(25).06.1923, 281.
43 Akty svtejego Tihona , 28.03(10.04).1924, 315.
44 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 364f, Nr.190; Akty svtejego Tihona, 08(21).03.1924, 313.
45 Akty svtejego Tihona , 09(22).03.1924, 313-314.
46 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 399-401, Nr.228; 402, Nr.229.
47 Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona , 392f, Nr.219.
48 Akty svtejego Tihona, 30.03(12.04).1925, 413-416f; Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona, 414-416,
Nr.234. In his testament Tikhon appointed for this function Metropolitan Kirill as the first candidate, Metropolitan
Agafangelas the secondcandidate and MetropolitanPetr (Polnskij) as thethird candidate (Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die
Orthodoxe Kirche, 714, text 259). The two first candidate being exiled, Petr assumed the position (Akty svtejego
Tihona, 25.03(07.04).1925, 757-768, p 757).
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At the same time the Patriach’s popularity was obviously the reason why the
Bolsheviks never tried to kill him. Tikhon was not entirely isolated and sometimes he was
allowed to lead a Church service.38 Finally, the trial was set for the 24th Mai 1923.39 On the
19th April 1923 the Patriarch was put in the jail of the Central Political Administration.40 On
the 16th June 1923 Tikhon wrote a letter to the High Court of the Russian Socialist Republic.
In this letter he recognized accusations against him, regretted his previous anti-Soviet
activities and asked the court to release him from jail. Tikhon also declared that he was no
more an enemy of the Soviet state.41 The court decided to release the Patriarch.42 The Court’s
decision was considered as a partial amnesty but the accusation against Tikhon was not
lifted.43 Later, on the 21st Mai 1924 the legal procedure against Tikhon was stopped, because
the influence of religion was reduced and the Patriarch no longer presented any danger to the
Soviet government.44 In an interview that Tikhon gave to the official newspaper, Izvestja, he
thanked the government for its trust and emphasized his loyalty.45 But in March 1925 the
Political Administration started planning a new trial against the patriarch. Tikhon was
accused of collecting material about antireligious persecution in Russia.46 Due to heart
illness,47 Tikhon died on the 7th April 1925.
Metropolitan Petr (Polnskij) became the administrator of the Russian Orthodox
Patriarchate on the 12th April 1925.48 In Mai 1925 Petr published a text, which was declared
to be the last will of patriarch Tikhon. The text contained the following main points: 1. the
Soviet government is from God; 2. the decree about the separation between state and church
of 1918 promotes freedom of religion; 3. it is a religious duty of Orthodox Christians to be
sincere towards the Soviet government and to condemn all anti-Soviet activities; 4. the Soviet
government represents indeed the interests of the working class and farmers; 5. Tikhon
condemns anti-Soviet activities of the immigrant Orthodox clergy; these people are asked to
49 Akty svtejego Tihona, 25.03(07.04).1925, 361-363; Sledstvennoe delo Patriarha Tuhona, 409-413,
Nr.232.
50 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 715-716, text 260.
51 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 723-724, text 262.
52 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 724-726, text 263.
53 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 726-730, text 264.
54 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 730-732, text 265.
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return to Russia and to repent for their activities.49 In his missive of the 28th July 1925 Petr
appealed to the Christians to obey the Soviet government.50
One primary aim of the Russian Orthodox Church during this time was to obtain
registration from the government, as the new law demanded that all religious societies be
registered. The Orthodox Church could not have an official administration as long as a
registration was not accorded. However, the Soviet government did not want to give it for
nothing, and concessions, which Tikhon and Petr had made, were obviously not sufficient.
Communists expected the Orthodox leadership to excommunicate the emigrant clergy. But
Petr was obviously not ready for this step. He was finally exiled.
The leading position within the Orthodox episcopate was gained by the Metropolitan
Sergij of Ninij Novgorod. In his letter to Soviet officials written on the 10th June 1926 Sergij
asked for registration.51 His declaration assured the Soviet government of the loyalty of the
Orthodox Church. In the same letter Sergij emphasized existing differences between the
Church and communism: It is a declared objective of the communists to extinguish belief
from people’s hearts, while the mission of Church is to plant this belief in people’s hearts.
Further Sergij declared that the Church cannot control the political opinions of its community
members nor can it punish the emigrant Orthodox clergy.52 This letter did not achieve any
significant change in the government’s position regarding the Orthodox Church. But a
significant change was achieved by the next letter, which Sergij wrote on the 29th July 1927.
Here Sergij declared that the Russian Orthodox Church identifies with the Soviet Union and
that clergymen who cannot adopt this patriotic attitude should leave the church. The letter
also condemned anti-Soviet activities of the Russian Orthodox clergy living abroad: These
people should recognize the Soviet Union or be separated from the Orthodox Church.53 After
this declaration the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church was allowed to be
registered.54
The first Constitution established separation between church and state as the basis for
further religious legislation in the Soviet Union: The law of 8 th April 1929 regulated that
religious societies have to be registered; 20 people over 18 years of age were requred to
55 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 735-738, text 267.
56 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 738-739, text 268.
57 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 748, text 274.
58 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 881, text 363.
59 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 899-900, text 368.
60Cf. Gerhard Simon, Berichtedes Bundesinstitutsfr ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien. Das
sowjetische Religionsgesetz vom Juni 1975, (Kln, 1976), 10-14.
61 For a detailed analysis: Gerhard Simon, Berichte des Bundesinstituts.
62 Simon, Berichte des Bundesinstituts, 1, 6.
63 ‘Fderales Gesetz.ber Gewissensfreiheit und religise Vereinigungen’, in: Osteuropa 48 (1998) 7, A
274-A 286, here A 274.
64 Gerd Stricker, ‘Das MoskauerPatriarchat im Zeichendes neuen Nationalismus’, in: Osteuropa 48(1998)
3, 269-281, p. 268.
65 Cf. RudolfUertz, ‘Einfhrung in die politischeTheorie des russisch-orthodoxen Christentums’, in: Josef
Thesing/Rudolf Uertz (eds.), Die Grundlagen der Sozialdoktrin der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche, Sankt Augustin
2001, 134-173, p. 134.
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constitute a religions society. Religious societies were forbidden to teach religion to
children.55 Art. 4 of the Russian constitution of 1929 did not mention “freedom of religious
propaganda” anymore, but assured the freedom of “religious confession.”56 The Constitution
of 1936 explained that the USSR guarantees to its citizens “freedom to accomplish religious
rites and freedom of antireligious propaganda”.57 Art. 57 of the decree of 19th July 1973
obliged parents to educate their children in the spirit of communism.58 And the preamble of
the Constitution of 1977 declared the education of communist persons to be a main task of
the Soviet state.59
But in reality laws were never the basis for treatment of church or Christians by the
Soviet administration. The actual source for different antireligious measures from the
beginning of 1960s were secret orders and decrees of Soviet officials, which were never
published.60 The law concerning religions published on the 23rd June 1975 modified some
articles of the earlier law of 1929,61 and fixed some regulations, which were already juridical
praxis for a number of years. It is therefore correct to say that this law did not represent any
legal novelty.62 The Perestroika policy did not initiate any changes to the condition of the
Russian Orthodox Church, but subsequently the situation changed considerably. The law of
1st October 1997 emphasized the eminent historical role of the Orthodox Church for the
Russian nation.63 At the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 the Russian Orthodox Church
regained the position within society that it had before the revolution of 1917.64 The Basic
Social Concepts of the Russian Orthodox Church elaborated by a church commission and
approved by the Moscow Synod (13-16 August 2000) is proof of an independent theological
thinking within the Russian Orthodox Church.65
66 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 758, text 282.
67 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 765, text 290.
68 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 776-777, text 298.
69 Metropolit Pimen described at the meeting of bishops (28th Mai 1971) the opinions concerning theparish
statute of 1961, which contradict the Soviet law as harmful for the Orthodox Church (Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die
Orthodoxe Kirche, 871, Text 359).
70 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 704-707, text 257.
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Looking back it is easy to say that identification with the Soviet state, which Sergij
declared in 1927, made it possible for the Orthodox Church to survive in Soviet Russia. But
any critical comment on the Soviet reality under these conditions was difficult to make. The
following historical developments only consolidated this situation. The German invasion of
Russia forced Stalin to look for moral support from the Orthodox Church. On 4th September
he received leading Orthodox hierarchs and promised them the opportunity to hold a synod
and to elect a new patriarch, as the patriarchal chair remained vacant after the death of
Tikhon.66 The synod was held in the beginning of 1945 (31st January-2nd February 1945). At
the opening session the participants thanked Stalin and the Soviet government for their care
of the Orthodox Church and for the possibility to grow that it has in Soviet Union.67
Metropolitan Nikolaj gave an account of the reception given by Stalin, rendered in panegyric
tones: the Metropolitan compared Stalin to a father who cares for his children.68 It is
remarkable that the moral support the Soviet state received from the Moscow Patriarchate
during the war did not change its status. The synod of 1945 proves that the Orthodox Church
was not only totally dependent on the Soviet government, but also entirely recognized its
moral authority. This point helps us to understand why the will of the Soviet government was
considered by Patriarchal leadership as the criteria of what is useful for the church.69 As a
result Orthodox clergymen and bishops, who opposed the religious politics of the Soviet state
were dismissed and defamed.
In reality, the situation of Orthodox clergymen and Christians in Soviet Union was
catastrophically bad. About half a year before his death, Patriarch Tikhon described in his
letter to the Soviet government written on 30th September 1924 the following situation: Large
numbers of the Orthodox clergy and Christians were arrested and exiled. The Soviet religious
politics destroyed the material basis of the Orthodox Church. The antireligious propaganda
created within society a climate of distrust and animosity towards the church. Churches and
monasteries were closed and transformed into clubs and cinemas.70 Exiled Orthodox bishops
addressed a memorandum on 7th June 1926 to the Soviet government. The document is one of
the shocking proofs of the existing gap between the Soviet legislation and the Soviet reality.
71 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 716-722, text 261.
72 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 840-848, text 343. For political oppression in Russia see:
Mark Hopkins, Russia’s Underground Press. The Chronicle of Current Events, New York 1983.
73 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 852-853, text 349.
74The newparishstatute was introduced because theSoviet government urged the Orthodox Church to adapt
its regulations to the Soviet laws. (Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 824-827, text 331).
75 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 858-860, text 351.
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Bishops emphasized, on the one hand, that the Soviet constitution guarantees to citizens
freedom of religion and stated, on the other hand, that in reality the church must submit to
essential restrictions: The clergy is not allowed to teach religion to people less than 18 years
of age, churches and monasteries were closed; Christians removed from schools, religious
books forbidden.71
During the mid 1960’s an opposition within the Orthodox Church began to arise.
They aimed their criticism not only at the Soviet government, but also at the Soviet friendly
Patriarchate leadership. A remarkable example of this conflict represents the open letter,
which priests Nikolaj Eliman and Gleb Jakunin addressed to the patriarch Aleksij on 21st
November 1965. The authors reproached the Orthodox leadership and the clergy for its total
support of the Soviet politics of destruction of the Church of Christ.72 The patriarch reacted
by removing Eliman and Jakunin from their functions as Orthodox priests.73 This measure
proved that the Orthodox patriarchate supported criminalization of religious literature and of
critics against the communist regime. Another revealing document from this period is the
letter, which archbishop Ermogen sent to the Patriarch on 25th December 1967. Ermogen
criticized in it the current methods of nomination of the Orthodox episcopate as well as
formation of the synod as not canonical. As for the parochial statute adopted in 1961,74 the
Archbishop explained that according to it, the Orthodox priests lost their leading role within
the parish and could not even be considered as a parish member.75 Ermogen was soon
punished: The synod described in a resolution of the 30th July 1968 Ermogen’s activities as
harmful to the Church and removed him from his function as an archbishop.76
Some words, spoken by Orthodox officials publicly, made it possible to recognize
that the Russian Orthodox Church now lived in very hard times. In a speech held on the 40th
anniversary of the Patriarchate, Aleksij emphasized that hardships are necessary for the
Church and asserted that the Church of Christ will never be entirely swallowed by Hell.77 In
his address to the participants of the conference of disarmament (Moscow 15-16 February
1961), Aleksij explained once again that afflictions are indispensable, but the Lord cares for
78 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 812-813, text 323.
79 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 805-806, text 318.
80 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 807-809, text 320.
81 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 894-899, text 367.
82 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 917-920, text 371.
83 Hauptmann/ Stricker, Die Orthodoxe Kirche, 913-916, text 370. Cf. interview with patriarch Pimen:
Pimen Patriarch von Moskau zur Situation des Glaubens in Russland. Ein Interview von Alceste Santini, Mnchen
1988, 120-122.
84To namejust someof them:Otto Luchterhandt, DerSowjetstaat und dieRussisch-Orthodoxe Kirche. Eine
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his Church so Hell will never overcome it.78 Apart from these rather coded statements it is
astonishing that despite its antireligious politics and active practices of Church destruction,
the Soviet government not only did not receive any criticism from the Moscow Patriarchate,
but the Orthodox leadership even supported Soviet politics in Russia and abroad. Patriarch
Aleksij justified the suppression of the Hungarian uprising by Soviet troops.79 Metropolit
Nikolaj adopted in his speech pronounced on 13 th May 1958 that the Soviet rhetoric of
“defense of peace” and “fight for peace” and described these activities as the most important
task.80 Statements, which Orthodox hierarchs made abroad, show that the Orthodox Church in
Russia approved the Soviet policies without restriction: Delegates of the Russian Orthodox
Church to the conference of the World Council of Churches in Nairobi (3 rd March 1976)
regretted that the Council built its opinion about conditions in the socialist countries on the
basis of statements given by emigrants and not by official delegates on these countries.81 The
declaration made by the synod of the Russian Orthodox Church on 20th March 1980
explained that Orthodox Christians take an active part in the construction of socialist society.
The declaration criticized the activities of NATO members in strong terms and justified the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.82
To legitimate its support of the Soviet state, the Orthodox leadership gave a positive
interpretation to developments during the post-revolutionary period in Russia. So in its
address on 23rd May 1978, the Orthodox synod emphasized Tikhon’s insight that the
Orthodox Church has to be open and sincere towards the Soviet Union and has to engage
with Soviet society. The synod called Patriarch Sergij a “clever and wise helmsman” who
contributed significantly to the normalization of the relationship between church and state
and promoted the spirit of patriotism by Christians. Merits of Aleksij were recognized too.83
A significant point of reference for this historical interpretation represented the mentioned
“testament” of patriarch Tikhon. In fact, the authenticity of this document was contested from
the very beginning and a large amount of research has been devoted to this problem.84 What
neuesten Zeit. I: Patriarch Tichon 1917-1925, Mnchen 1965; Johannes Chrysostomus, ‘Kirche und Staat in
Sowjetruland. Das Schicksal des Moskauer Patriarchats 1917-1960’, in: Jahrbuch fr Geschichte Osteuropas 11
(1963)13-36; Roman Rssler, Kirche und Revolution in Russland, Patriarch Tichonund derSowjetstaat, Kln/Wien
1969. I discuss this question in a different study: Igor Pochoshajew, ‘Patriarch Tichon und die Sowjetmacht’,
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 124 (2007).
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is remarkable is that no official Orthodox presentation written during the Soviet time or even
during the Perestroika indicates how problematic this issue is, but just presents the
“testament” as the last word of Tikhon concerning the church relation to the Soviet state.85 A
recent Russian Orthodox analysis finally settled the problem as follows: The “testament” is a
product of the Soviet political administration. Tikhon always refused to sign it. So it was
published after Tikhon’s death, when the Patriarch could not revoke it any more.86
On the one hand, this conclusion satisfyingly solves the problem of the “testament,”
but, on the other hand, in its light, official Orthodox declarations concerning the “testament”
in particular and the situation of the Orthodox Church and Christians in Soviet Russia in
general apparently need a revision. It is remarkable how continuously the fact of religious
persecution in the Soviet Union was denied by Orthodox officials. Even in his interview,
according to the Italian journalist Alceste Santini on 3rd January 1987, Patriarch Pimen
emphasized that the Soviet constitution guarantees to citizens the freedom of religion and
nobody is persecuted in the Soviet state because of his faith.87 But soon Soviet officials
themselves gave a very different description of the Soviet reality: The new chief of the
commission of religious affairs, Konstantin Harov, argued in 1988 that the laws of 1929
“chained” the church and created conditions for arbitrary treatment by the Soviet state.
Harov emphasized that not laws but secret orders of Soviet officials represented the basis for
repression against the church.88 Gorbav spoke on 29th April 1988 to high Orthodox leaders
of a religious repression in the Soviet Union and assured them that the rights of the Orthodox
Church would be reestablished.89
Alexander Men’ was one of the Russian Orthodox priests who actively de-sovietized
the consciousness of Russian people. Men’ did not belong to Soviet dissidents; he refused to
sign the open letter written by Nikolaj Eliman and Gleb Jakunin. Men’ did not criticize the
Soviet state openly, but indeed Men’ was more dangerous for the Soviet totalitarian system
than a political dissident because he persuaded others of the incompatibility between the
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put’ k dialogu, Moskva 2001, 23-40, p. 31-32.
91A. Bessmertnyj-Ancimirov, in: I byloutro …Vospominaniob otceAleksandre Mene, Moskva 1992, 330-
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93 Russian text: Aleksandr Men’, ‘Religi, «kul’t linosti» i sekularnoe gosudarstvo’, in: Aleksandr Men’,
Trudnyj put’ k dialogu, Moskva 2001, 127-168. English translation: Roberts/ Shukman, Christianity for theTwenty-
First Century, 109-138.
94 ZoMaslenikova,izn’ otca Aleksandra Men, Moskau 1995, 234.
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RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVII, 1 (February 2007) page 32
Christian faith and communist ideology.90 To spread his ideas, Men’ organized small groups,
which were the most appropriate method to oppose the totalitarian regime in Russia.91
According to his convictions Men’ focused on literary activity.92 In “Religion, the
‘Cult of Personality,’ and the Secular State” Men’ analyses recent Soviet history,
characterizing Russian society as ill. The totalitarian system is the cause. To explain the
phenomenon of the ‘Cult of Personality,’ Men’s historical analysis begins with Roman
emperors, leading through the Medieval Period to the Russian revolution of 1917. Men’ does
not idealize conditions in monarchic Russia, but affirms that non-Orthodox Christians were
brutally oppressed. Men’ explains that the coalition between monarchy and church destroyed
people’s trust in the Orthodox Church, the church failing to accomplish its mission within
society. Men’ gives a positive assessment of the principle of separation between state and
church. He thniks that the ‘medicine’ against a possible relapse into a totalitarian regime in
Russia is a consistent application of the principle of a secular state.93 However, the decisive
factor for Men’ is not structural changes, but ethical growth of the individual. Men’ argues
that all political reforms will remain useless as long as a spiritual renewal of people does not
take place. This renewal is to be accomplished through a long educational process of
fostering Christian consciousness.94 Consequently, Men’ attributes to Christianity a central
role for the ethical renewal of Russian society.95 As to the situation of the Orthodox Church
during the Soviet time, Men’ stated critically that the church could not play an active role and
was practically reduced to issuing statements in support of Soviet politics.96
To assess the actual and future relevance of Men’s thinking for public opinion in
Russia, two factors have to be considered: 1. the attitude of official Orthodoxy to Men’; 2.
Men’s popularity. Concerning the first point we must take into account that Men’s
assessment of the church-state relationship in monarchic Russia is quite different from the
official Orthodox position. The Basic Social Concepts regards the Orthodox state as the best
97 Basic Social Concepts of the Russian Orthodox Church: III. Church and state.
98 Patriarch Aleksij, in: Pamti protoiereja Aleksandra Men, Moskva 1991, 20.
99 Aleksandr Zorin, Angelernoraboij, Moskva 2004, 230-240.
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Work of Alexander Men, London 1996, 2, 24-25. On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of Men’s death on the 9th
September 2005 Russian television presented a program about Elexander Men’. In Germany, academy of diocese
Rottenburg-Stuttgart confers annually an Alexander-Men’-prize of merit in intercultural mediation between Russia
and Germany.
101 G.A., Eliceev, Istorireligij, Moskva 1997. This book is recommended by the Ministry for Education
of Russian Federation for use in the 10th and 11 th school classes
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political system.97 So we should not be surprised by the fact that Men’s position is not
recognized as ‘orthodox.’ In his letter on the occasion of Men’s funeral, the Patriarch
recognized the merits of this Orthodox priest, but at the same time emphasized that his
opinions did not necessarily represent the position of the Russian Orthodox Church.98 The
attitude of the Orthodox clergy toward Men’ is rather divided. But in Russian intellectual
circles Men’s works enjoy great popularity. Educated people and open minded Orthodox
clergymen use Men’s books as standard works.99 Given the particular social role of this
group of people, I agree with authors in Russia and in the West who consider the ideas of
Alexander Men’ of growing importance.100
As to the textbook History of Religion101 that I focus on in this study, it is remarkable
that it does not speak about the “October revolution,” but uses the term “October overthrow.”
The book says that the October overthrow was opposed by the Russian Orthodox Church.
Tikhon condemned cruelties of the new government. On the 1918 decree on separation
between church and state, the book explains that it formally abolished the church’s
dependence on the state and could therefore be regarded as a positive measure of the new
government. In reality this law intended the destruction of the Russian Orthodox Church, the
proof of it being the murder of thousands of Orthodox monks and clergymen during the civil
war and after. The book further says that the Orthodox Church was oppressed by the Soviet
government. It is why a new patriarch could not be elected after the death of Tikhon. Even as
Sergij appealed to Christians to recognize the new government, the persecution did not stop.
Clergymen were wrongly accused of supporting counterrevolutionary activities and sent to
labor camps. The book emphasizes that World War II obliged Stalin to revise religious
policies, Stalin wanting to use the Orthodox Church to mobilize patriotism in the Russian
population. The book explains that on this occasion it was possible because during the
centuries the Orthodox Church in Russia was associated with the Russian nation. For this
purpose Stalin ordered priests to be released from camps and allowed a new patriarch to be
102 Eliceev, Istorireligij, 271-272.
103 Vasilenko, ‘Hristianstvo i kul’tura’, 474.
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elected. After Stalin’s death in 1953 repressions resumed. Although not as bloody as at the
start of Soviet history, the Orthodox Church was entirely subdued to the repressive Soviet
administration. At the same time the Soviet government promoted the most obscene and
cynical antireligious propaganda, but the Orthodox Church continued to exist despite the
dominant doctrine of atheism. Its authority has even continuously grown from the second
half of 1980’s. The breakdown of the Soviet system and disintegration of the Soviet Union
caused a miraculous growth of influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. 102
Apart from historical details presented in this textbook, which I do not want to
discuss here, the description it gives is objective. Although the author does not hide
his negative attitude toward the Soviet regime, nor does he distort reality in general
on behalf of his feelings. Summing up, one may say that sources readily available to
the Russian public nowadays give a rather unanimous interpretation of the situation
of the Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet period. I could not find any
official Orthodox interpretation published recently, but I did not analyze teaching
material used in Orthodox educational institutions in Russia. The educated and open-
minded Russian public, who read Alexander Men’, will learn from him how
important Christian ethics are in order to avoid a new totalitarian system in Russia.
Surely, this opinion is very questionable if we consider that during history, Christian
ethics have not necessarily promoted democratic systems, but within the
‘evolutionary’ theology of Men’ it sounds consistent: Men’s argues that Christianity
stands actually at the very beginning of its historical development.103 We must
conclude that it will not return to errors of its past. As to the textbook, its quite
differentiated description of historical details will surely promote critical thinking in
the new Russian generation. At the same time the textbook offers a theological
interpretation: The Russian Orthodox Church has not only survived adverse Soviet
reality but has been strengthened by it. I do not know whether the author intended to
say it explicitly, but it is clear to me from his book. It calls to mind the words of
Aleksij, that the gates of Hell will not swallow the Church of Christ.
